Abstract. We define an effective, sound and complete game semantics for HA inf , Intuitionistic Arithmetic with ω-rule. Our semantics is equivalent to the original semantics proposed by Lorentzen [6], but it is based on the more recent notions of "backtracking" ([5], [2] ) and of isomorphism between proofs and strategies ([8]). We prove that winning strategies in our game semantics are tree-isomorphic to the set of proofs of some variant of HA inf , and that they are a sound and complete interpretation of HAinf.
Why game semantics of Intuitionistic Arithmetic?
In [7] , S.Hayashi proposed the use of an effective game semantics in his Proof Animation project. The goal of the project is "animating" (turning into algorithms) proofs of program specifications, in order to find bugs in the way a specification is formalized. Proofs are formalized in classical Arithmetic, and the method chosen for "animating" proofs is a simplified version of Coquand's game interpretation ([4] , [5] ) of PA inf , classical arithmetic with ω-rule. The interest of the game interpretation is that it interprets rules of classical arithmetic by very simple operations, like arithmetical operation, reference to a pointer, adding and removing elements to a stack. Coquand, however, defined implication A → B as classical implication, as "A is false or B is true". In real proofs, instead, we often use the constructive definition of implication A ⇒ B, which is: "assume A in order to prove B". A ⇒ B is classically equivalent to "A is false or B is true", but this means that in order to interpret a proof in Coquand's semantics we have first to modify it. If we want some control and understanding of the algorithm we extract from a proof, instead, it is crucial to animate the original proof. In this paper we adapt Coquand's game semantics of PA inf to game semantics of Intuitionistic Arithmetic HA inf with intuitionistic implication ⇒. Our semantics is equivalent to the original Lorentzen's game semantics [6] , and also bears some similarity with Hyland-Ong game semantics for simply typed lambda terms [10] . The main difference between our semantics and Lorentzen's semantics is that we do no not add dummy moves when interpreting connectives, but when interpreting implication (see §4.4 for a discussion). Reducing the number of dummy moves is crucial in order to make evident the relationship between a game strategy and the intuitionistic proof interpreted by the strategy. The main difference between our semantics and Hyland-Ong's semantics is, instead, that we consider all connectives as Lorentzen did. In this way the difference between the game interpretation for implication and the game interpretation for all other connectives becomes evident. The game interpretation of the intuitionistic implication introduced in this paper aims to be one step in the Proof Animation project. What is still missing are game semantics combining all features of real proofs: classical logic, intuitionistic implication, cut rule, induction rule, and so forth. We claim that the semantics introduced in this paper can also be used to interpret Cut rule through the notion of dialogue, as it was done by Coquand, Hyland-Ong and Herbelin. We did not include Cut rule for reason of space. Even without Cut rule, we can use our semantic to interpret the evidence provided by an intuitionistic proof in term of very simple operations, without blurring the relation with the proof structure during the interpretation.
The plan of the paper
This is the plan of the paper. In §2 we introduce the language of arithmetic. In §3 we introduce our game semantics. In §4, §5 we discuss our definition of game, comparing it with Lorentzen's. In §6 we introduce HAinf, intuitionistic arithmetic with ω-rule. In §7, 8 we prove that winning strategies of our semantics are tree-isomorphic with the proofs of some variant of HA inf , and that our game semantics is sound and complete for HAinf. In §9 we introduce one example of winning strategy in our game semantics. This winning strategy can also be seen as a proof in HAinf. In §10 we introduce one example of play which uses the winning strategy defined in §9.
The language of Arithmetic
In this section we introduce a language LHA for first order arithmetic, the notion of judgement, and the notion of sequent. In the next section we define our game semantics. L HA has a connective A ⇒ B denoting intuitionistic implication. We also introduce a "game language" L G ⊃ L HA for game semantics. The formulas of LG denote games interpreting formulas of LHA. Each connective of LHA corresponds to some operator defining games in L G , an operator which we will denote with the same symbol. In this way each formula of LHA will be also considered as a denotation for some game in L HA interpreting it. The only difference between L G and L HA is that HA has one extra connective →. The connective → denotes one binary operator on games, used as an intermediate step in the interpretation of intuitionistic implication ⇒ (see §4.4 for a discussion). We divide the formulas of the game language L G into disjunctive and conjunctive, by generalizing the usual distinction between disjunctive and conjunctive formulas we have in Logic. We consider A ⇒ B a conjunction, and A → B a disjunction. The language L HA , for intuitionistic arithmetic, consists of all formulas of LG which are →-free. C ∈ L G0 is the tree of all subformula occurrences of C, ordered by the subformula relation <. If C ∈ L HA , then C by definition is →-free. Yet, the subformula tree of C in LG0 can include occurrences of some A → B, the children of the occurrences of some A ⇒ B in the tree. The only difference between an occurrence of A ⇒ B and an occurrence of A → B is that the former is conjunctive while the latter is disjunctive. This duplication of nodes looks useless, but it will play a crucial role in §4. 4 For instance, the immediate sub-judgements of t.A → B are f.A and t.B, while the immediate sub-judgements of f.A → B are t.A and f.B. If we restrict the sub-judgement relation to judgements of L HA , then the immediate sub-judgements of t.A ⇒ B are f.A, t.B, as expected. We will now introduce a notion of pointed sequent: sequents having one "active formula" in evidence. We first recall what (finite) multisets are. A multiset is a set with possibly repetitions, in which elements x1, . . . , xn are distinguished through the use of labels. We use positive integers as labels. We formalize a multiset X with the set of its indexes paired with the corresponding elements:
We often write X = x 1 , . . . , x n , leaving i 1 , . . . , i n implicit: the actual indexing is irrelevant. We use Γ, ∆, Γ , ∆ , . . . to denote multisets of closed formulas in L G0 . {A} is the multiset consisting of one pair j, A for some j > 0. We denote the disjoint union of two multisets Γ and ∆ with Γ, ∆. By renaming indexing, we can always assume two multisets are disjoint. We denote Γ, {A} with Γ, A. 
Definition 5. (Intuitionistic Sequents and occurrences) Let
We denote the active formula of a sequent boldface, for instance: Γ, A D for a negative occurrence of A, and Γ, A D for a positive occurrence of D. Any two sequents over L HA0 , differing only for the active occurrence, like Γ, A D and Γ, A D, will be equivalent in our game semantics (by Theorem 3). This is not always the case for a sequent of L G0 .
Game semantics for Arithmetical Formulas
In this section we define our game semantics for formulas of LG0. In the next section we unfold our definition and discuss its consequences. We interpret (pointed) sequents Γ D, i as games are between two sides, E and A. E is a single, finite and fallible being we call Eloise, able to learn from her mistakes. A is a potentially infinite array of omniscient, infallible beings we call the Abelard's, one for each move of the play. The omniscience of the Abelard's compensates the ability of Eloise to learn from her mistakes. Having one Abelard for each move of the game, instead, is just a colorful way of saying that Abelard decides his next move by considering only the previous move of the play. Therefore the replies of Abelard to two different moves are independent each other, and we can imagine they are made by two different individuals. Eloise can use all previous moves of the play to decide her next move, therefore her moves are related each other and we image them as made by a single individual. The play between E, A is interpreted as a debate. The play between E and each Abelard is called a "thread" in the play (we use the word "thread" with its informal meaning in Computer Science). In each position of the play, E defends a thesis, and one Abelard attacks it, or vice versa. Moves done in defence of a thesis cannot be retracted, for all players. The weak player, E, can retract finitely many times a move done while attacking a thesis of A. The strong players, the Abelard's, can never retract a move (neither in attack, nor in defence). There is also a thesis for the whole play. E claims that some Γ D is true, while the array of Abelard's claims that Γ D is false. We interpret truth of Γ D by the existence of a recursive winning strategy for E on the game associated to the pointed sequent Γ D, i , for some i. We first introduce plays and correct moves. Moves include moves of Tarski plays [9] . This kind of move is called a logical move, and denoted by a judgement sA. There is a new kind of moves, "backtracking", when E comes back to the move number i of the play, retracts the move she did after it, and selects a new move, with the goal of learning better and better moves in this way. This kind of move is called a structural move, and denoted by bck (i) . The idea of backtracking is taken from [4] , [5] , [2] (a similar idea can be found in [10] , where it is used to interpret λ-terms). However, backtracking in our game semantics for intuitionism has a severe limitation: E can backtrack to any judgement having a negative sign, but only to the last judgement having a positive sign. 
If Q is any position, the indexing of logical moves (or judgements) in
Q is: 1 for the first logical move, 2 for the second one, and so forth.
Informally, we could describe a position as an "unfinished play". We define now the player E/A moving from a given position Q, and the set of correct moves from Q. Only E can move bck (i) , that is, only E can "backtrack" to the judgement number i of Q, with the further limitation that if i is the index of a positive judgement, this judgement has to be the last positive judgement of Q. Since E can come back to the logical move number i, the last logical move for E is not, necessarily, the last logical move of the sequence. We call the last logical move for E: the active move of the position. For each position Q we define: the backtracking indexes, the active move and its index, the next player moving and its correct moves.
Definition 9.
(Correct moves) Let P be any position, having n > 0 logical moves. 
i is a backtracking index of P , a bck-index for short, if: :
(i) 1 ≤ i ≤ n; (ii) if the i-
Q is a correct extension of P if Q ≥ P , and for any P ≤ R@ m ≤ Q, the move m is correct from R.
If the active move of P is t.A, we say that E defends, in P , the thesis A, while some Abelard attacks the thesis A. If the active move of P is f.A, we say that E attacks, in P , the thesis A while some Abelard defends the thesis A. We now define the winner and the loser for any (finished) play P . We allow a play to use any position P as initial segment. The game associated G P to a position P is the set of all positions we can reach from P using only correct moves of the next player. Positions and sequents are interchangeable notions. Any position P is associated to some sequent seq(P ) = Γ D, i (see the definition below). seq(P ) is defined by interpreting each move m in P as an operation building a sequent, by Def. 7.4. We imagine that, in the position P , E claims that Γ D, i is true, and A claims it is false. Conversely, any pointed sequent Γ D, i is associated to some canonical position P = pos(Γ D, i), and to some game G(Γ D, i) having P as initial position. 
By definition unfolding, we can check that "taking the associated position" and "taking the associated sequent" are two operations inverse each other (up to index renaming). 
The initial position of the game G(Γ D, i) is P = pos(Γ D, i). In the initial position of G(Γ D, i), E claims that seq(P ) = Γ D , i is true, while A claims it is false. The initial position of G(A) is pos(
A, 1) = t.A. We will now define winning strategies for E on a game as particular recursive trees. We first define a coding for recursive trees, and an indexing Children(x) for the children of a node x.
Definition 12. (Coding recursive trees)
-A tree T over M is any set of finite lists over M , including the empty list and closed under prefix.
for the children of a node x. -A tree is recursive if it is coded by a recursive set.
-A labeling over a tree is any map l : T → I assigning some label l(x) ∈ I to each x ∈ T .
From now on, we always code trees by sets of lists. If x, y are lists, we denote the concatenation of x, y by x@y. We define winning strategies for E on a game G P as particular recursive well-founded trees σ on the set Moves. Here is how σ works. During the play, the current position of the play is always P @x, for some x ∈ σ. σ is defined in such a way that, whenever E moves from P @x, there is exactly one child x@ m ∈ σ of the current node x ∈ σ. m ∈ Moves is the correct move = drop suggested by σ to E from P @x. Since m ∈ Moves, then E cannot play drop. Whenever A moves, instead, the children y of x are all x@ m ∈ Moves which are correct moves = drop of A from P @x. E chooses the child x@ m corresponding to the actual move m by A (unless A plays drop, in which case play ends). Since σ is well-founded, after finitely many moves the play ends. The loser is necessarily A, because A is the only player who can play drop.
Definition 13. (Recursive winning strategies for E on GP ) Fix any position P . Let σ be any tree over the set Moves.
1. For any x ∈ T , we call seq P (x) = seq(P @x) the sequent labeling x.
σ is a strategy for E on GP if for all x ∈ T , if p is the player moving from P @x:
-if p = E, then Children(x) = {m}, for some correct move m = drop from P @x.
is the set of all correct moves = drop from P @x.
σ is winning if it is a well-founded tree. σ is recursive if it is a recursive tree.
We can now define validity in our game semantics.
Definition 14. Let Γ D, i be any sequent of LG0.
σ |= Γ D, i if σ is a recursive winning strategy for
We can characterize a strategy on any game G P as follows: 
Unfolding our definition of game
In this section we informally describe the games G(A) and G (Γ D, i) , by unfolding the formal definition from the previous section. We stress the differences with Lorentzen's games. which are: our games extend Tarski games ( §4.1), are defined by restricting Coquand's notion of backtracking ( §4.2, 4.3), and make a reduced use of insertion of dummy moves in the play ( §4.4). In §10 we will include an example of winning strategy and one example of play.
Interpreting positive formulas
Let A ∈ L + 0 be any positive formula (i.e., any closed formula in the connectives F, T, ∨, ∧, ∃, ∀). Let P ∈ G(A). We claim that P runs as in Tarski play [9] . According to Def. 11, the initial position of G(A) is t.A. The sub-judgements of t.A are all t.B, for B sub-formula of A. t.A has no negative sub-judgements f.B, because there are no →, ⇒, ¬ in A. By Def. 9, A cannot backtrack, while E can only backtrack to the last positive judgement, hence to the last judgement, because all judgements in P are positive. Thus, the active move of any non-empty prefix of P is always the last judgement. Therefore all logical move are some immediate sub-judgement of the previous judgement. This means we can skip all moves bck(i) from P , and we still obtain a legal play. After we simplify P in this way, we have
Correct moves are exactly as in Tarski games [9] . In Lorentzen, the relation with this simple and basic notion of game is instead somehow hidden. If t.A i is a disjunctive formula, then E chooses t.Ai+1, and if t.Ai is a conjunctive formula, then A chooses t.A i+1 . In all moves t.A i , E defends A i while A attacks Ai. This play has a single "thread", which is a debate about the truth of A. 
and he loses. A fails attacking T : E convinces A that T is true. In Tarski games, the roles of E and A are perfectly symmetrical, and A is true if and only if E has a winning strategy on the game associated to A. This is not the case in our game interpretation, because we only allow recursive strategies for E, while there is no restriction on the strategy for A. E is a finite and fallible being, while all Abelard's in the array A can be omniscient. The game associated to A is therefore strongly biased in favor of A. Indeed, E has no recursive winning strategy on the game associated to some true A ∈ L + 0 (see Corollary 2.1). The canonical strategy for the Abelard's is selecting some false sub-judgement if any exists, otherwise drop out. This strategy is winning if and only if A is true.
Interpreting the negation of a positive formula
Let A ∈ L + 0 be any positive formula. We discuss now the game G(A F ) associated to A F (a sequent with active formula A). A F is equivalent to the negation of A. The initial position of the game is t.F, f.A. By Def. 11, sub-judgments of f.A are exactly all f.B with B subformula of A: all sub-judgements of f.A have sign f., because there is no connective →, ⇒, ¬ in A. In all judgements f.B, A defends B while E attacks B. There is some symmetry with the game G(A), but it is only apparent. Here, backtracking is a useful move for E, because she can come back to any previous logical move f.B (there is no restriction for backtracking on negative judgements). This means that, whenever E thinks she did a mistake by selecting some f.B < 1 f.B, she can come back to f.B and select a different f.B <1 f.B. This starts a new "thread" in the play, a debate about the falsity of f.B . The play from f.B evolves as it were a Coquand's play [5] . Initially, there is only one "thread" in the play, a debate about the falsity of A. Each time E backtracks, some thread forks, and a new thread starts. We interpret the fact that A cannot backtrack by imagining that there is some Abelard from the array A associated to each negative judgement, who ignores the history of the play, and moves using this judgement as only information. Whenever E moves f.B from f.B, a new Abelard is detached from the array A, in order to defend B. This Abelard waits, possibly forever, that E comes back to f.B. If and when this happens, E moves f.B against this Abelard, opening a new thread in the play, while again, a new Abelard is detached in order to defend B. The number of Abelard's in the play grows with time. At each step, there are as many Abelard's as negative judgements in P . E is only facing one of them at the time, the one defending the active judgement of P . E can switch at any time to a different Abelard, moving bck(i) for some i.
We interpret the fact that E can change a wrong move, and therefore knows the history of the play, by the fact that E is a single individual. Through backtracking, this individual evolves with time, "learning from her mistakes". Each Abelard in the array A does not know the history of the game, and he cannot backtrack. Therefore he must choose the best move on the first try, using only the information available from the judgement. This is not a problem for the Abelard's, because we assumed all of them to be omniscient. The fact that E can learn from her mistake compensates for the omniscience of A. In fact (assuming that A is a positive formula), the game G(A F ) is perfectly equilibrate: E has a recursive winning strategy if and only if A is false in the standard model N (Corollary 2.2). The canonical strategy for the Abelard's, select some false sub-judgement if any exists, otherwise drop out, is winning if and only if A is true. For some A there is no recursive winning strategy for the Abelard's: in this case, the omniscience of the Abelard's is essential to make the game equilibrate. There are two asymmetries in our notion of game. There is an asymmetry E/A, and there is an asymmetry defence/attack. A move defending a formula, done by any player, must be perfect on the first try: truth must be flawless. A move attacking a formula can be retracted a finite number of times: falsity can be established after finitely many attempts. Only the weaker player, E, has the privilege of retracting moves. A has already the advantage of omniscience (i.e., of possibly using non-recursive strategies). Therefore A cannot retract moves. G(A 1 , . . . , A n F ), for A1, . . . , An ∈ L + 0 . The game runs as the game G(A F ), except that, already in the initial position, there are n negative judgment, therefore n Abelard's against E, and n threads in the play. In the initial position, E is facing the Abelard defending f.An, but she can change the Abelard she is facing at will.
An obvious generalization of the game G(A F ) is the game

Interpreting the entailment relation
is, according to our definition, t.D, f.A1, . . . , f.An. This game is a combination of the games discussed in the two previous subsections. There are n+1 Abelard's against E, one attacking D, and n more Abelard's defending A 1 , . . . , A n . Hayashi proposed to call "tutors" these latter, because E hopes to learn from them how to defend D. By definition unfolding, E is currently facing the Abelard defending An. E can backtrack to any negative judgement, but only to the last positive judgement. This means that E can learn by trial-and-error the best move to attack each A1, while her move defending D is irreversible, and must be correct on the first try, and this fact makes her weaker. The thread of the play from t.D evolves as it were a Tarski play with a recursive strategy (see §4.1), while the threads from all A i evolve as they were Coquand's play [5] 
Interpreting the intuitionistic implication ⇒
We now consider the most general case, a game G (A 1 , . . . , A n D, i) , for some A1, . . . , An, D ∈ LG0. There are four new cases: when the active move of P is t.C or f.C, for C = A → B or A ⇒ B. → is an operator defining games, and is the standard interpretation of implication in Tarski games, but not in our games. In our game semantics, we interpret the intuitionistic implication as ⇒. parallel. We simplified this pattern, making all moves the choice of a subjudgement, and interleaving a dummy move only to interpret implication. We cannot avoid dummy moves completely, but we localized the source of this problem in the implication connective alone.
The operator → is not a sound and complete interpretation of Intuitionistic implication
In this section we check that we cannot interpret intuitionistic implication with just →. The correct interpretation is instead ⇒ ( §8).
→ is not a sound and complete interpretation of intuitionistic implication.
Proof.
1. Assume E has a recursive winning strategy σ on the game with initial position t.∀x.
. We have to define, recursively over on t, a recursive winning strategy τ for E, either on
∈ σ be the current position of the play. The player moving from P is E. Then, by definition of strategy, P has a unique child in σ.
-Assume P, t.C(t) is the only child of P in σ. P, t.C(t) has last positive judgement t.C(t). E, from now on, cannot backtrack to any judgement in P (both judgements in P are positive). Let ρ = {Q ∈ σ|Q ≥ P, t.C(t)}. ρ is a recursive winning strategy for E on G P,t.C(t) , including only moves bck(i) with i > 2, because ρ never backtracks to P . Remove the prefix P from any Q ∈ ρ, and replace each bck(i) in Q with bck(i − 2). The resulting tree τ is a strategy on G t.C(t) = G(C(t)), winning because ρ is. -Assume P, f.A(t) → F is the only child of P in σ. If A replies t.A(t), then the current position is P, f.A(t) → F, t.A(t), and t.A(t) is the last positive judgement. E, from now on, cannot backtrack to any judgement in P (both judgements in P are positive). Let ρ = {Q ∈ σ|Q ≥ P }. ρ is a recursive winning strategy for E on G P , including only moves bck(i) with i > 2, because ρ never backtracks to P . Replace P with t.¬(A(t) → F ) in any Q ∈ ρ, and replace each bck(i) in Q with bck(i − 1). The resulting tree τ is a strategy on for
, because f.A(t) → F , the first move suggested by ρ from P , is a correct move also from t.¬(A(t) → F ). τ is winning because ρ is. 6 HA inf , Intuitionistic Arithmetic with ω-rule
In this section we introduce HA inf , an infinitary sequent calculus (with pointed sequents) for Intuitionistic Arithmetic. We also introduce an infinitary logic G inf for deriving validity of formulas of L G0 in our game semantics. Proofs in Ginf are isomorphic to winning strategies (Theorem 2). Eventually, in §8 we prove that G inf is a conservative extension of HAinf, and we conclude that our game semantics is sound and complete for HA inf . The language of HA inf is L HA0 and the language for G inf is L G0 . We first define logical rules of Ginf and HAinf a synthetic way, using the operation Γ D, i + sA from Def. 7. Then we unfold our definition, in order to check that it is equivalent to the usual one for HAinf. In G inf , for each sequent there is (at most) one logical rule having conclusion this sequent. In the definition above, there are 11 possible cases for A: A true or false atomic formula, or A starting any of the 9 connectives of L G . There are 2 possible signs. Therefore there are at most 11 × 2 = 22 possible cases for logical rules. There is no logical rule, however, if sA is disjunctive and there is no s A < 1 sA, because a logical rule for a disjunctive sA requires one s A <1 sA. The are only two cases of this kind: sA = t.F, f.T , both disjunctive and without immediate sub-judgements. Therefore, if we unfold the definition of logical rule, we obtain 22−2 = 20 cases for a logical rule in G inf 1 : rules for ∧, ∀, ∨, ∃) . Let i = 1 or i = 2, and t be any closed term.
rules of implication →) Remark that the logical rule for
A → B in the right-hand-side has two sub-cases.
We can unfold the logical rules for HAinf in a similar way. The only difference between HA inf and G inf is that in HA inf the rules for A → B are skipped, and the rules for A ⇒ B have hypotheses with active formulas A, B, because the immediate subformulas of A ⇒ B in L HA are A, B:
We consider only one structural rule both for HAinf and Ginf, Exchange, switching the active formula of a sequent. E-rule says that two sequents differing only for the active formula are equivalent. In Lemma 6.5, we will prove that ConjE is conditionally derivable in G inf from DisjE for all sequents of L HA (i.e., for all sequents without →). We will deduce that Ginf is a conservative extension of HAinf. Besides, strategies in our game semantics and proofs of G inf can be identified (see Theorem 2) . By combining the two remarks, we will conclude that our game semantics are sound and complete for HAinf. Proofs of HA inf (of G inf ) are all well-founded recursive trees, labeled with sequents, and such that the sequent labeling each node is the conclusion of some rule of HA inf (of G inf ). We code proofs as trees over Moves, in order to stress the similarity between proofs of G inf and winning strategies.
Assume Π is any well-founded, recursive tree over Moves.
The labeling of Π with sequents is, for all
there is some rule of HAinf (in Ginf) whose conclusion is: seq S (x), and whose assumptions are:
We unfold the definition above, in order to explain how we code each rule of HAinf and Ginf. The root of Π is coded . Assume x ∈ Π, and the sequent seq(x) labeling x has active move sA. If x is the conclusion of some logical rule, then the children of x in Π are coded by all (by some) x@ s A , for s A < 1 sA, according if x is conjunctive or disjunctive. If x is the conclusion of some structural rule, then the children of x in Π are coded by some x@ bck(i) . Introduction rule for → from Natural Deduction (if Γ, A B, then Γ A → B) is conditionally derivable in HAinf 2 . All other structural rules are derivable in L HA : identity, weakening, exchange (for all formulas), contraction in the left-hand side and cut. For instance, all previous rules in the left-hand side implicitly include contraction. Indeed, from
We can characterize proofs of G inf as particular trees of moves. -either sA is disjunctive and Children(x) = {bck(j)}, for some index j of seq S (x); -or sA is disjunctive and Children(x) = {s A }, for some s A < 1 sA.
-or sA is conjunctive and Children(x) = {s A |s A < 1 sA}.
Proof. By definition unfolding, and because the only structural rule of G inf is DisjE.
We will prove in Theorem 3 that G inf is a conservative extension of HA inf . In §3, from this fact we will derive that our game semantic is sound and complete for HA inf .
Conjunctive structural rule is conditionally derivable
In this section we prove that ConjE (conjunctive structural rule, §6) is derivable from the other rules of Ginf, for all sequents of LHA (i.e., →-free). We will deduce that G inf is a conservative extension of HA inf . We do not use the particular coding we have chosen for proofs, but only the fact that provability in G inf is closed under all rules of Def. 16, 17 having finitely many premises. There are also rules of Ginf with infinitely many premises: the logical rule for ∃ in the left-hand-side, and for ∀ in the right-hand-side. For these rules, we use a weaker closure property: assume there is a recursive map taking any closed term t, and returning a proof of Γ,
A dual closure property holds for ∀ in the right-hand-side. Our goal is proving ConjE in G inf . We introduce an intermediate system Proof We define the recursive map by induction over the proof, distinguishing one case for each possible rule at the end of the proof. In each case we apply the inductive hypothesis to the assumptions of the rule, then the rule itself.
The previous Lemma derives Weakening also for G inf , G inf + . We now prove that, whenever we have a proof of Γ D in G inf + , and a conjunctive occurrence A( = B → C) in Γ D, then we can assume the last rule of the proof is a logical rule with active formula A. Proof. , we apply Lemma 7.3, and we obtain a family of proofs of ∆ A , i in Ginf + , one for each A <1 A, recursively indexed over A . In both subcases, we apply first the induction hypothesis on A , in order to deduce ∆, A A or ∆ A in Ginf + (with active formula A ). Then we apply the only logical rule inferring A, and we conclude ∆ A (with active formula A). 2. The rules of G inf + ConjE are either the logical rules of G inf + , or Exchange, and Exchange is derivable in G inf + by the previous point. We showed that G inf + ConjE and G inf + have the same theorems. There is only left to show that Ginf + and Ginf have the same →-free theorems.
By induction over
Proof. In view of Lemma 9, we can assume that Γ D, i has a canonical indexing, so we can apply Theorem 2. Now suppose Γ A, i has a proof Π in HAinf. By Corollary 1, Γ A, i has a proof Π in G inf . By Theorem 2, Π is also a recursive winning strategy for E on G (Γ A, i) . Suppose the converse: E has some recursive winning strategy σ on G (Γ A, i) . By Theorem 2 again, σ is a proof of Γ A, i in Ginf, and by Corollary 1 we have a proof in in HAinf.
As a consequence of the main Theorem, we check that our game semantics does not validate some true positive formula, while it validates the negation of all false positive formulas. A is false (in the standard model of N Q(y) ). In this section we include a recursive winning strategy σ for t.A ⇒ B. By Theorem 2, σ is also a proof of A ⇒ B in HA inf . In §10 we include a play following this strategy σ. In the proof-tree below, we include the sequent labelling each node of the tree, and print boldface the active occurrence of each sequent. We include the move associated to each child of each node, and we add a label "1 :", "2 :", . . . in front of the logical move number 1, 2, . . . of the strategy. The strategy-tree we draw is incomplete: we should add one branch for each value of t and each value of u. In the particular branches included in the picture, we assumed that P (t) and Q(u) are true. Branches with P (t) or Q(u) false (not included below) are slightly different. We leave the reader check that this strategy-tree is also a proof-tree of HA inf , without the rule ConjE. Indeed, each node is the conclusion of some rule of HAinf.
For some true A we have ¬(G |= A).
G |= A F if and only if
A, ∃x.P (x), P (t), T, ∃y.Q(y), Q(u), T T A, ∃x.P (x), P (t), T, ∃y.Q(y), Q(u), T P(t)
A, ∃x.P (x), P (t), T, ∃y.Q(y), Q(u), T T A, ∃x.P (x), P (t), T, ∃y.Q(y), Q(u), T Q(u) 14 : t.T A, ∃x.P (x), P (t), T, ∃y.Q(y), Q(u), T P(t) ∧ Q(u) 13 : t.P (t) or t.Q
A, ∃x.P (x), P (t), T, ∃y.Q(y), Q(u), T ∃y.(P(t) ∧ Q(y))
: t.P (t) ∧ Q(u)
A, ∃x.P (x), P (t) 
